Хвасон-14 -- северокорейский ПГРК с МБР

[Serge3leo]

Старый пишет:
В центре - разделение ступеней, справа - отделение боеголовки

Нет, ну всё может быть, быть может, якобы, не только 151с первая ступень и 224с вторая ступень наддавали газу и ускорения, но ещё и боеголовка тоже разгонялась почти 30с. Почему нет?

Давайте дождёмся успешного пуска, который расставит всё на свои места.

[Старый]

Я думаю если бы запуск был неудачным Ким бы так не радовался.

[Serge3leo]

Старый пишет:
Я думаю если бы запуск был неудачным Ким бы так не радовался.

Пуск 4 июля очевидно не был удачным:

• И взлетело всего на 2800 км, ниже 3700 км от 28-ого и 4400 км по плану;
• И пыталось лететь чёрт знает куда, в сторону Японии, а не к намеченной цели;
• И скачок/излом на телеметрии был всего один, а не два как 28-ого, т.е. последняя ступень даже и не хрюкнула, и не подала признаков жизни;
  

А Ким весьма и весьма радовался, полетело же, да и все поверили же     Это его стиль, вспомним Кванмёнсон-2  

[Наперстянка]

Serge3leo пишет:
4 июля самоуничтожение произошло в конце работы второй (предпоследней) или в самом начале работы третьей (последней) ступени;

    Если бы существовала вторая ступень, то остатки ее давно подняли бы на корабль и предъявили общественности.

[Serge3leo]

Наперстянка пишет:

Serge3leo пишет:
4 июля самоуничтожение произошло в конце работы второй (предпоследней) или в самом начале работы третьей (последней) ступени;

Если бы существовала вторая ступень, то остатки ее давно подняли бы на корабль и предъявили общественности.

А это ничего, что глубина Японского моря в точке указанной МО РФ - 3500м? Как, впрочем, и в точках указанных всеми остальными тоже не мельче 3000 м  

[Наперстянка]

Serge3leo пишет:
А это ничего, что глубина Японского моря в точке указанной МО РФ - 3500м? Как, впрочем, и в точках указанных всеми остальными тоже не мельче 3000 м  

Вы что, не видели, как плавает на воде мусор: бочки, бутылки, разные пром. емкости? Всегда что-нибудь остается плавать.

[Дмитрий Инфан]

Кадры явно постановочные, поэтому графики на мониторах могут означать что угодно.

[Serge3leo]

Наперстянка пишет:
Вы что, не видели, как плавает на воде мусор: бочки, бутылки, разные пром. емкости? Всегда что-нибудь остается плавать.

Близ мыса Канаверал выпадают в океан не только вторые, но и первые ступени. Таки разве много чего за 80 лет прибило к берегам той же Кубы? 

Дмитрий Инфан пишет:
Кадры явно постановочные, поэтому графики на мониторах могут означать что угодно.

Постановочные кадры могут быть честнее подтасованных данных. Для разных испытаний они разнятся, так что они отражают некоторый аспект действительности.

[Наперстянка]

Serge3leo пишет:
Близ мыса Канаверал выпадают в океан не только вторые, но и первые ступени. Таки разве много чего за 80 лет прибило к берегам той же Кубы?

   Подлодки везде шныряют, выгребают все подчистую даже со дна, да так, что и плюшкин им в пятки не годится.

[Наперстянка]

МОСКВА, 10 авг — РИА Новости. Ракеты КНДР могут долететь до территории острова Гуам примерно за 14 минут, сообщает издание USA Today со ссылкой на представителя местного управления национальной безопасности Дженну Гаминде (Jenna Gaminde). ... .

РИА Новости https://ria.ru/world/20170810/1500127560.html

[Наперстянка]

МОСКВА, 11 авг — РИА Новости. Ракеты, протестированные КНДР в июле, не способны донести полновесные ядерные боеголовки до континентальной части США, сообщает издание Newsweek со ссылкой на доклад американских и немецких экспертов. Они пришли к выводу, что во время испытаний небольшие заряды позволили ракетам подняться гораздо выше, чем если бы они были оснащены более тяжелыми боеголовками.
 
КНДР в июле провела два испытания баллистических ракет "Хвасон-14". По данным США, Южной Кореи и Японии, ракеты являются межконтинентальными. По данным военных РФ, выпущенные КНДР баллистические ракеты были средней дальности. КНДР в свою очередь оба раза заявляла об успешном проведении пусков межконтинентальных баллистических ракет.
Эксперт по ракетам Массачусетского технологического института Тед Постол и два эксперта из немецкой фирмы Schmucker Technologie Маркус Шиллер и Роберт Шмукер в своем докладе заявляют, что ракеты несли небольшой заряд, не соответствующий весу ядерных боеголовок.
"Мир внезапно поверил, что у северокорейцев есть межконтинентальная баллистическая ракета, которая способна достичь западного побережья США. Но, согласно нашим расчетам, основанным на детализированном изучении типа, размера ракетных двигателей, длительности полетов, топлива, которое, вероятно, использовалось, и других технических факторов, оказалось, что ракеты на самом деле несли очень небольшие заряды, вес которых  не соответствовал весу ядерных боеголовок", — пишут авторы доклада.
 
Ученые отмечают, что эти небольшие заряды позволили ракетам подняться гораздо выше, чем они смогли бы подняться, будучи оснащенными гораздо более тяжелыми боеголовками.
Тед Постол также назвал ракеты КНДР "фальшивкой", пишет издание.
В последнюю неделю Пхеньян и Вашингтон обменялись рядом угрожающих заявлений. Сначала президент Дональд Трамп пригрозил Северной Корее ответить "огнем и яростью" в случае, если со стороны КНДР будет реальная угроза для США. В ответ Центральное телеграфное агентство Кореи (ЦТАК) сообщило, что северокорейские военные изучают возможность нанесения ракетного удара по военным объектам США на острове Гуам в западной части Тихого океана. На это Трамп пообещал, что если лидер КНДР Ким Чен Ын "сделает что-то с Гуамом, с Северной Кореей произойдет такое событие, которого еще никто никогда не видывал".

РИА Новости https://ria.ru/world/20170811/1500229554.html

   
  Переучившиеся ученые так и не сказали,- чем плоха боеголовка с малым весом, например, двухтригерная схема с тритиевым лазером и с применением Pu-244. 100-150 кг 80-ти тонная ракетка как-нибудь на орбиту всяко выведет, да еще на маневрирующие имитаторы штук на двадцать хватит.

[triage]

сообщает издание Newsweek со ссылкой на доклад американских и немецких экспертов. 
....
Эксперт по ракетам Массачусетского технологического института Тед Постол и два эксперта из немецкой фирмы Schmucker Technologie Маркус Шиллер и Роберт Шмукер в своем докладе заявляют

понравилось американских во множественном числе. Newsweek во множественном числе американцев не пишет, хотя там в тексте есть другие американские эксперты с другой точкой зрения.

p.s.заявление немецкого эксперта от 2012 года http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-missiles-study-idUSBRE83Q00K20120427 German analysts say new North Korea missiles are fakes

Само сообщение Newsweek

http://www.newsweek.com/trump-north-korea-missiles-nuclear-scientists-649702
...
Massachusetts Institute of Technology rocket expert Ted Postol and two German experts, Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker of Schmucker Technologie, published their findings Friday in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, in a paper they titled "North Korea's 'Not Quite' ICBM Can't Hit the Lower 48 States." Newsweek saw an early version of the paper.

Postol is professor of science, technology and national security policy at MIT who has advised the Pentagon and Congress on missile-related defense projects. Schiller and Schmucker are missile engineers with the Munich-based company who have previously analyzed North Korean missiles, and in 2012 determined that the country's supposed ICBMs were "fakes." Schiller has worked on missile analyses for NATO, the EU, the German and Austrian armed forces and other institutions in Europe. Schmucker has worked at NASA and served as a U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq.

"From the point of view of North Korean political leadership, the general reaction to the July 4 and July 28 launches could not have been better," the authors wrote. "The world suddenly believed that the North Koreans had an ICBM that could reach the West Coast of the United States and beyond. But calculations we have made—based on detailed study of the type and size of the rocket motors used, the flight times of the stages of the rockets, the propellant likely used, and other technical factors—indicate that these rockets actually carried very small payloads that were nowhere near the weight of a nuclear warhead of the type North Korea could have, or could eventually have. These small payloads allowed the rockets to be lofted to far higher altitudes than they would have if loaded with a much-heavier warhead, creating the impression that North Korea was on the cusp of achieving ICBM capability."

Postol during an interview with Newsweek called the missiles "a hoax," although Friday's report doesn't use that language.

The White House has not responded to a request for comment Friday morning. Newsweek will update if and when it does.

"The reality is the North Korean Hwasong-14 is a sub-level ICBM that will not be able to deliver atom bombs to the continental United States," the scientists wrote in a draft version of their report shared exclusively with Newsweek.

The scientists based their analysis on publicly available information about the trajectories of the missiles lofted on July 4 and July 28. These independent experts determined that defense and other analysts who decided the North Korean missiles could carry the weight of a nuclear payload were focused on the rocket motor's ability to place the rocket on maximum achievable range, as opposed to maximum achievable altitude.

In other words, the independent analysts believe that the North Korean rocket scientists engineered the power of their rockets with an eye toward gaining height, without demonstrating that their devices had the range or thrust to fly far enough horizontally—while carrying the extra weight of a nuclear bomb—to hit a target in Alaska or the continental U.S.

The independent analysts also wrote that the two July missiles carried reduced payload weights in order to increase the altitude of their trajectories.

Based on what the analysts know about the North Korean rocket, they estimated that in order for the missiles to reach Seattle while carrying a nuclear bomb, the payload would have to weigh 300 kilograms, and in order to reach Anchorage, the bomb would have to weigh less than 500 to 550 kilograms.

"Since it is extremely unlikely that a first generation weaponized North Korean atomic bomb would weigh substantially less than 500 kilograms, we conclude that neither variant of the Hwasong-14 missile could deliver a first generation North Korean atomic bomb to the continental United States," the authors concluded.

Their analysis deviates from an anonymously sourced Defense Intelligence Agency report published in The Washington Post earlier this week suggesting that the North Koreans have miniaturized atomic bombs that their rockets could loft into the United States.

But based on an examination of what was purported to be an atomic bomb the North Koreans displayed in 1998, as well as on available intelligence about bombs that have been developed in Pakistan and Libya, and taking into consideration available information about the material resources and abilities of the rogue nation's scientists, the independent analysts conclude, "It is overwhelmingly likely that it would not weigh less than 500 kilograms."

The authors warned the rocket tests demonstrated that the North Korean missile technology was advancing, and that the country will eventually produce missiles with sufficient payloads to deliver atomic bombs to the continental United States, but that is "probably years away."

Another independent expert, Michael Elleman, senior fellow for missile defense at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the new report is the first to identify the engine propelling the North Korean rockets, information that allows researchers to narrow their assumptions about the missile's capability. "They have greater fidelity, in other words," he said. But Elleman said the weight of the payload in the July missile tests remains uncertain.

In a separate statement attached to the article, Postol, an expert in ballistic missile defense, stated that while existing ballistic missile defenses "will never work reliably," there is still time to develop a defense system with available U.S. technology.

И их публикация в http://thebulletin.org/north-korea%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cnot-quite%E2%80%9D-icbm-can%E2%80%99t-hit-lower-48-states11012
Там много текста и картинок

...
In reality, the North Korean rocket fired twice last month—the Hwasong-14—is a "sub-level" ICBM that will not be able to deliver nuclear warheads to the continental United States. Our analysis shows that the current variant of the Hwasong-14 may not even be capable of delivering a first-generation nuclear warhead to Anchorage, Alaska, although such a possibility cannot be categorically ruled out. But even if North Korea is now capable of fabricating a relatively light-weight, "miniaturized" atomic bomb that can survive the extreme reentry environments of long-range rocket delivery, it will, with certainty, not be able to deliver such an atomic bomb to the lower 48 states of the United States with the rocket tested on July 3 and July 28.
...
As those curves show, if the North Koreans have achieved the capability of creating a missile warhead as light-weight as those used by the Chinese and Pakistani militaries—no small feat for a country with means as limited as North Korea's—the two missiles fired in July could carry that missile roughly 6,000 kilometers, approximately the distance to Anchorage, Alaska. The missiles simply could not carry such a warhead to the lower 48 states.
...
We believe North Korea is capable of building such a variant of the Hwasong-14, and that variant could have the capability to deliver a first-generation weaponized North Korean atomic bomb to Anchorage, Alaska, and slightly beyond.
....
Since it is extremely unlikely that a first-generation weaponized North Korean atomic bomb would weigh substantially less than 500 kilograms, we conclude that neither variant of the Hwasong-14 missile could deliver a first-generation North Korean atomic bomb to the continental United States.
...

В конце пишут про двигатели, иногда упоминают российское (точнее советские разработки)

[Наперстянка]

pnetmon пишет:
В конце пишут про двигатели, иногда упоминают российское.

Не плохо упомянуть российский двигатель РД-216 (8Д514), так как сделан был более полувека назад, но не смотря на то, что является четырехкамерным, элементарно может применяться для запуска спутников.

[АниКей]

rbc.ru NYT рассказала о связях ракетной программы Северной Кореи с Украиной
По данным экспертного исследования, в последних испытанных Северной Кореей ракетах использовались двигатели, произведенные на украинском «Южмаше». К таким же выводам пришли в разведке США, пишет The New York Times
 
 
 
 
 
КНДР смогла провести испытания межконтинентальной баллистической ракеты (МБР), после того как приобрела на черном рынке мощные ракетные двигатели. Двигатели «вероятно» куплены у украинского завода, «который исторически связан с ракетной программой России», говорится в опубликованном в понедельник аналитическом материале Международного института стратегических исследований (IISS). Также эти данные подтверждаются засекреченными оценками разведывательных служб США, пишет газета The New York Times. Исследование IISS также опубликовано на официальном сайте института.
 

Спойлер

За последние два года после ряда неудачных запусков Пхеньян изменил конструкцию ракет и своих поставщиков. Аналитики, в частности, изучили фотографии лидера КНДР Ким Чен Ына, осматривающего новые ракетные двигатели, и заключили, что их конструкция основана на конструкции ракет, которые некогда использовались в Советском Союзе. Как пишет газета, благодаря таким двигателям ракета «могла перебросить десять термоядерных боеголовок между континентами». Такие двигатели делают на ряде объектов на территории стран, ранее входивших в составе СССР. В частности, и власти США, и эксперты IISS обратили внимание на предприятие «Южмаша» в украинском Днепре (ранее Днепропетровске).
После отстранения от власти экс-президента Виктора Януковича в 2014 году для предприятия «настали нелегкие времена», пишет газета. Россия отменила заказы на модернизацию ядерного компонента своего флота.
По данным издания, в КНДР могли попасть двигатели РД-250, использовавшиеся в советских ракетных комплексах Р-36. В IISS пришли к такому заключению, проанализировав видеозаписи пусков ракет, опубликованных северокорейской стороной.
Майкл Эллман, автор аналитического материала IISS, заявил в интервью газете, что, «вероятно, что эти двигатели пришли с Украины, возможно, незаконно». «Вопрос заключается в том, как много [двигателей] у них [КНДР] сейчас есть и помогают ли им украинцы до сих пор», — добавил он. Эллман также рассказал, что о попытках Пхеньяна украсть технологии у украинского комплекса шесть лет назад сообщали в ООН. В докладе организации говорилось, что тогда поймали двух граждан КНДР. Они пытались украсть информацию о продвинутых ракетных системах, жидкотопливных двигателях, космических аппаратах и системах подачи ракетного топлива. В IISS предполагают, что Ким Чен Ын мог воспользоваться кризисом на Украине и предпринял повторную попытку украсть эти технологии.
Как пишет газета, анализ Эллмана подтверждает то, о чем в разведке США уже долго говорят в частных беседах: в новых ракетах, запускаемых КНДР, использованы настолько сложные технологии, что Пхеньян сам по себе не смог бы их освоить в столь короткое время. Первый тест нового двигателя прошел в сентябре 2016 года, а через десять месяцев власти Северной Кореи отчитались о первом успешном запуске МБР. Это слишком короткий период для разработки технологии самостоятельно, «если только они не смогли купить конструкцию, технику и знания на черном рынке».
В разведке США считают, пишет NYT, что Пхеньян на протяжении десятилетий прибегал к услугам черного рынка ракетных технологий. Также власти КНДР создали инфраструктуру из собственных университетов, центров разработки технологий и предприятий отрасли.
NYT отмечает, что до конца не известно, кто ответственен за продажу ракет и технологий КНДР, в разведывательных кругах США есть «различные теории». Эллман «не смог исключить вероятность того», что к передаче двигателей РД-250 мог быть причастен «Энергомаш», «который обладает крепкими связями с украинским комплексом».
В Белом доме не прокомментировали эти сведения разведки США. «Южмаш» 5 июля разместил на своем сайте комментарий в связи с публикациями о переговорах с Китаем. В «Южмаше» заявили, что «любая передача технологий другим странам для организации производства ракетно-космической техники является, с точки зрения «Южмаша», нецелесообразной».
РБК направил запросы в «Роскосмос» («Энергомаш» является дочерней компанией госкорпорации) и в «Южмаш». В «Роскосмосе» не стали комментировать информацию. «Южмаш» распространил опровержение информации NYT. На предприятии отметили, что не поставляют в Россию «ни ракеты, ни их детали и сборочные единицы» и никогда не имели и не имеют отношения к ракетной программе Пхеньяна. «Южмаш» соблюдает все требования режима контроля за ракетными технологиями, говорится в сообщении.
«Единственный серийный двигатель, поставляемый в последние годы на экспорт (РД-843 в Италию для европейской ракеты-носителя «Вега»), предназначен для запуска и работы в условиях открытого космоса и по своим характеристикам (в том числе, по силе тяги) непригоден для использования в баллистических ракетах военного назначения», — добавили в компании.
Секретарь Совета национальной безопасности и обороны Украины (СНБО) Александр Турчинов заявил, что «предприятия украинского оборонного и авиакосмического комплекса не поставляли оружие и военные технологии в Северную Корею». Информацию NYT он назвал не имеющей под собой никаких оснований и провокационной по содержанию. Публикация, по словам Турчинова, «скорее всего, спровоцирована российскими спецслужбами для прикрытия собственных преступлений» (цитаты по сообщению на сайте СНБО).
КНДР осуществила тестовый запуск МБР «Хвасон-14» 4 июля, представитель Минобороны США Джефф Дэвис назвал ее ракетой нового типа. В Пхеньяне заявили, что ракета поднялась на высоту 2802 км, она преодолела 933 км.
В Минобороны России заявили, что дальность полета ракеты составила 510 км, а высота — 535 км.
 Авторы: Андрей Гатинский, Инна Сидоркова, Екатерина Костина.

[свернуть]

[АниКей]

iiss.org  The secret to North Korea's ICBM success  
 


 

 
By Michael Elleman, Senior Fellow for Missile Defence
North Korea's missile programme has made astounding strides over the past two years. An arsenal that had been based on short- and medium-range missiles along with an intermediate-range Musudan that repeatedly failed flight tests, has suddenly been supplemented by two new missiles: the intermediate-range Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Hwasong-14. No other country has transitioned fr om a medium-range capability to an ICBM in such a short time. What explains this rapid progression? The answer is simple. North Korea has acquired a high-performance liquid-propellant engine (LPE) fr om a foreign source.
Available evidence clearly indicates that the LPE is based on the Soviet RD-250 family of engines, and has been modified to operate as the boosting force for the Hwasong-12 and -14. An unknown number of these engines were probably acquired though illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine. North Korea's need for an alternative to the failing Musudan and the recent appearance of the RD-250 engine along with other evidence, suggests the transfers occurred within the past two years.
 Tests reveal recent technical gains  
North Korea ground tested a large LPE in September 2016, which it claimed could generate 80 tonnes' thrust. The same LPE was again ground tested in March 2017. This test included four smaller, steering engines. On 14 May 2017, with Kim Jong-un overseeing test preparations, North Korea launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Hwasong-12. The single-stage missile flew on a very steep trajectory, reaching a peak altitude of over 2,000km. If the Hwasong-12 had used a normal flight path, it would have travelled between 4,000 and 4,500km, placing Guam, just 3,400km away, within range.
The success of the Hwasong-12 flight in May gave North Korean engineers the confidence needed to pursue a more ambitious goal: the initial flight testing of a two-stage missile capable of reaching the continental United States. Less than two months after the Hwasong-12 test, the two-stage Hwasong-14 was launched on 4 July. A second Hwasong-14 was tested on 28 July. The Hwasong-14 launches flew on very steep flight paths, with the first shot reaching an apogee of 2,700km. The second test peaked at about 3,800km.
North Korea's announced results were independently confirmed by the Republic of Korea, Japan and US. In both tests, the mock warheads plummeted towards the East Sea, 900–1,000km fr om the launch point. If flown on a trajectory that maximises range instead of peak altitude, the two missiles would have reached about 7,000km and 9,000km respectively, well exceeding the 5,500km minimum distance for a system to be categorised as an ICBM.
The dimensions and visible features of the Hwasong-12 indicate an overall mass of between 24,000 and 25,000kg. The Hwasong-12's acceleration at lift-off, as determined by the launch video aired by KCNA, is about 8.5 to 9.0m/s2. Assuming North Korea did not manipulate the launch video, the thrust generated by the Hwasong-12's complete engine assembly is between 45 and 47 tonnes' thrust; the main engine contributes between 39 to 41 tonnes' force, and the auxiliary engines about 6 tonnes' force. The Hwasong-14 has an estimated mass of 33,000–34,000kg, and an initial acceleration rate of about 4–4.5m/s2, resulting in a total thrust of 46–48 tonnes' force.
 Identifying the new LPE and its origins
The origins of the new engine (see Figures 1 and 2) are difficult to determine with certainty. However, a process of elimination sharply narrows the possibilities.
There is no evidence to suggest that North Korea successfully designed and developed the LPE indigenously. Even if, after importing Scud and Nodong engines, North Korea had mastered the production of clones, which remains debateable, this does not mean that it could design, develop and manufacture a large LPE fr om scratch, especially one that uses higher-performance propellants and generates 40 tonnes' thrust.

Figure 1: The liquid-propellant engines ground tested in September 2016 and March 2017 appear to be the same, though only the second ground test and the Hwasong-12 flight test operate with four auxiliary or vernier engines, which steer the missile. See larger version.
Claims that the LPE is a North Korean product would be more believable if the country's experts had in the recent past developed and tested a series of smaller, less powerful engines, but there are no reports of such activities. Indeed, prior to the Hwasong-12 and -14 flights, every liquid-fuelled missile launched by North Korea – all of the Scuds and Nodongs, even the Musudan – was powered by an engine developed and originally produced by the Russian enterprise named for A.M. Isayev; the Scud, Nodong and R-27 (from which the Musudan is derived) missiles were designed and originally produced by the Russian concern named after V.P. Makeyev. It is, therefore, far more likely that the Hwasong-12 and -14 are powered by an LPE imported from an established missile power.
If this engine was imported, most potential sources can be eliminated because the external features, propellant combination and performance profile of the LPE in question are unique. The engine tested by North Korea does not physically resemble any LPE manufactured by the US, France, China, Japan, India or Iran. Nor do any of these countries produce an engine that uses storable propellants and generates the thrust delivered by the Hwasong-12 and -14 LPE. This leaves the former Soviet Union as the most likely source.

Figure 2: The three missiles tested by North Korea are powered by the same engine complex, with one main engine and four steering engines. See larger version.
Given North Korea's reliance to date on technologies originating with the Isayev and Makeyev enterprises, one might suspect one or both as the probable supplier. However, neither enterprise has been associated with an engine that matches the performance of LPE used by Hwasong-12 and -14.
An exhaustive search of engines produced by other manufacturers in the former Soviet Union yields a couple of possibilities, all of which are associated with the Russian enterprise named after V.P. Glushko, now known as Energomash. The RD-217, RD-225 and RD-250 engine families use high-energy, storable-liquid propellants similar to those employed by engines tested by North Korea. Neither the RD-217 nor RD-225 have external features matching those of North Korea's new engine. The RD-250 is the only match.

Figure 3: The RD-250 engine consists of a pair of combustion chambers fed by a single turbopump. Each chamber produces about 394k Newtons of thrust, or about 40 tonnes' force, when relying on UDMH as the fuel, and N2O4 as the oxidiser. The RD-250's nozzle also features a cooling tube and a compliance ring that resemble those found on the engines tested by North Korea. The small engine with its nozzle pointed upward and displayed in the foreground is not associated with the RD-250 engine. See larger version.
The RD-250 engine is normally configured as a pair of combustion chambers, which receive propellant from a single turbopump, as shown in Figure 3. When operated in tandem, the two chambers generate roughly 78–80 tonnes' thrust. This level of thrust is similar to the claims North Korea made when the first ground test was conducted and publicised in September 2016.
It gradually became clear, however, that the Hwasong-12 and -14 used single-chamber engines. Note, for example, that Pyongyang claimed that a new pump design was used for the September ground test. This makes sense, because operating the RD-250 as a single chamber LPE would necessitate a new or modified turbopump. Having no demonstrated experience modifying or developing large LPE turbopumps, Pyongyang's engineers would have been hard pressed to make the modifications themselves. Rather, the technical skills needed to modify the existing RD-250 turbopump, or fashioning a new one capable of feeding propellant to a single chamber would reside with experts with a rich history of working with the RD-250. Such expertise is available at Russia's Energomash concern and Ukraine's //KB%20Yuzhnoye. One has to conclude that the modified engines were made in those factories.
The alternative hypothesis, that Russian/Ukraine engineers were employed in North Korea is less likely, given the absence of any known production facility in North Korea for such engines. In addition, Western experts who visited KB Yuzhnoye Ukraine within the past year told the author that a single-chamber version was on display at a nearby university and that a local engineer boasted about producing it.
Why single-chamber engines were transferred rather than the more powerful double-chamber original versions is unclear. One possible hypothesis is that the exporters, for whatever reason, exercised restraint in what they were willing to transfer to North Korea. Combined with a second stage, however, the single-chamber RD-250 engine is powerful enough to send an ICBM to cities on the American West Coast at least.
The RD-250 was originally designed by the Glushko enterprise of Russia, and produced and incorporated into the first stage of the R-36 (SS-9) ICBM and the Tsiklon-2 satellite launcher by KB Yuzhnoye of Ukraine. The Tsiklon-2 carrier rocket lofted its first satellite into orbit in 1969, with the last of 106 launches occurring in 2006. While Yuzhnoye was responsible for producing the Tsiklon-2 rocket, Russian entities launched the satellite. The relationship survived the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 primarily because of long-standing institutional linkages, and the commercial interests of both enterprises and countries. However, despite the Tsiklon-2's unsurpassed reliability record, Russia stopped purchasing the Yuzhnoye rocket in 2006 in favour of an indigenous system. Yuzhnoye's repeated attempts to market the rocket and related technologies to other potential customers, including Boeing and Brazil, yielded little. The once vaunted KB Yuzhnoye has been near financial collapse since roughly 2015.
The total number of RD-250 engines fabricated in Russia and Ukraine is not known. However, there are almost certainly hundreds, if not more, of spares stored at KB Yuzhnoye's facilities and at warehouses in Russia wh ere the Tsiklon-2 was used. Spares may also exist at one or more of Energomash's many facilities spread across Russia. Because the RD-250 is no longer employed by operational missiles or launchers, facilities warehousing the obsolete LPEs are probably loosely guarded. A small team of disgruntled employees or underpaid guards at any one of the storage sites, and with access to the LPEs, could be enticed to steal a few dozen engines by one of the many illicit arms dealers, criminal networks, or transnational smugglers operating in the former Soviet Union. The engines (less than two metres tall and one metre wide) can be flown or, more likely, transported by train through Russia to North Korea.
Pyongyang has many connections in Russia, including with the illicit network that funnelled Scud, Nodong and R-27 (Musudan) hardware to North Korea in the 1980s and 1990s. United Nations sanctions imposed on Pyongyang have likely strengthened the Kim regime's ties to these criminal networks. North Korean agents seeking missile technology are also known to operate in Ukraine. In 2012, for example, two North Korean nationals were arrested and convicted by Ukrainian authorities for attempting to procure missile hardware from Yuzhnoye. Today, Yuzhnoye's facilities lie close to the front lines of the Russian-controlled secessionist territory. Clearly, there is no shortage of potential routes through which North Korea might have acquired the few dozen RD-250 engines that would be needed for an ICBM programme.
 How did North Korea acquire the RD-250 engine?
When and from wh ere RD-250 engines may have been shipped to North Korea is difficult to determine. It is possible the transfers occurred in the 1990s, when North Korea was actively procuring Scud- and Nodong-related hardware, as well as R-27 technology and its Isayev 4D10 engine. But this seems unlikely for three reasons.
Firstly, the network North Korea relied on in the 1990s focused on products originating from Russia's Makeyev and Isayev enterprises. Energomash and Yuzhnoye had limited connections to Makeyev or Isayev; indeed, they were rival enterprises competing for contracts as the Soviet Union crumbled. It is, therefore, a stretch to assume the illicit channels Pyongyang was using in the 1990s had access to products manufactured or used at either Yuzhnoye or Energomash two decades ago.
Secondly, until recently, North Korea appeared to focus on exploiting R-27 hardware for its long-range missile ambitions. Pyongyang's first intermediate-range missile, the Musudan, which was first displayed in a 2010 parade, is derived from the R-27 technology acquired in the 1990s. Moreover, until the Hwasong-12 launch in March 2017, Pyongyang's design concepts for a prospective ICBM featured a first stage powered by a cluster of two Isayev 4D10 LPEs. Photographs taken while Kim Jong-un toured a missile plant in March 2016 captured the back end of an ICBM prototype that appeared to house a pair of 4D10 engines, not a single RD-250 LPE. A month later, Kim attended the ground test featuring a cluster of two 4D10 engines operating in tandem, a clear indication that North Korea's future ICBM would rely on this configuration. There is no evidence during this period to suggest that North Korea was developing a missile based on the RD-250 engine.
Thirdly, the Isayev 4D10 engine, which relies on staged combustion, is a complicated closed-cycle system that is integrated within the missile's fuel tank. If the open-cycle, externally mounted RD-250 engine had been available in 2015, engineers would have likely preferred to use it to power a new long-range missile, as it shares many features with the engines North Korea has worked with for decades.
However, when North Korean specialists began flight testing the Musudan in 2016, the missile repeatedly failed soon after ignition. Only one flight test is believed to have been successful. The cause of the string of failures cannot be determined from media reports. That many failed very early in flight suggests that problems with either the engine itself, or the unique 'submerged' configuration of the engine, were responsible. If this was the case, North Korea's engineers may have recognised that they could not easily overcome the challenges. This might explain why the Musudan has not been tested since 2016.
The maiden appearance of the modified RD-250 in September 2016 roughly coincides with North Korea's decision to halt Musudan testing. It is reasonable to speculate that Kim's engineers knew the Musudan presented grim or insurmountable technical challenges, which prompted a search for an alternative. If North Korea began its quest to identify and procure a new LPE in 2016, the start of the search would have occurred in the same year Yuzhnoye was experiencing the full impact of its financial shortfalls. This is not to suggest that the Ukrainian government was involved, and not necessarily Yuzhnoye executives. Workers at Yuzhnoye facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Pavlograd were likely the first ones to suffer the consequences of the economic misfortunes, leaving them susceptible to exploitation by unscrupulous traders, arms dealers and transnational criminals operating in Russia, Ukraine and elsewh ere.
 North Korea's ICBM still a work in progress
Acquisition of the modified RD-250 engine enabled North Korea to bypass the failing Musudan development effort and begin work on creating an ICBM sooner than previously expected. The Hwasong-14, however, is not yet an operationally viable system. Additional flight tests are needed to assess the missile's navigation and guidance capabilities, overall performance under operational conditions and its reliability. Empirical data derived from tests to validate the efficacy of warhead re-entry technologies is also needed. Pyongyang could elect to deploy the Hwasong-14 as early as 2018, after only a handful of additional test launches, but at the risk of fielding a missile with marginal reliability. The risks could be reduced over time by continuing flight trials after the missile is assigned to combat units.
Further, the Hwasong-14 employs an underpowered second stage, which could lim it Kim Jong-un to threatening only those American cities situated along the Pacific Coast. Arguably, Pyongyang will want a more powerful ICBM, one that can target the entire US mainland. The modified RD-250 engine can be clustered to provide a basis for an improved ICBM, but development of a new missile will require time.
It is not too late for the US and its allies, along with China and perhaps Russia, to negotiate an agreement that bans future missile testing, and effectively prevents North Korea from perfecting its capacity to terrorise America with nuclear weapons. But the window of opportunity will soon close, so diplomatic action must be taken immediately.

[Apollo13]

Брюгге жжет. Я все конечно понимаю, но как северокорецы ТНА РД-250 распиливают - вдоль или поперек?  

[PIN]

Статья более-менее высосана из пальца, но аргумент с ТНА тоже "не катит".

[Старый]

О чём этот текст? При чём тут РД-250?

[triage]

Скопировать что ли статью трёх аналитиков (американца и двух немцев) в новости Энергомаша.  т.к. его упоминали. Там писали про доставшееся Северной Корее в 90х годах

[Apollo13]

Старый пишет:
О чём этот текст? При чём тут РД-250?

О прекрасном.

Western experts who visited KB Yuzhnoye Ukraine within the past year told the author that a single-chamber version was on display at a nearby university and that a local engineer boasted about producing it.